[PDF]An inquiry into the state of the nation, at the commencement of the present administration ..

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Robert E. Gross
Collection

A Memorial to the Founder
of the


Business Administration Library

f'/i/iterit/u o/^ya/i/or^tud

Los Angeles


waiN INQUIRY


INTO THB


STATE OF THE NATION,


C. Slower, Pdntcr,
Patcrnostfer-row,


:i


AN iNQumr


INTO THE


STATE OF THE NATION,


COMMENCEMENT


OF TBE


PRESENT ADMINISTRATION.


" In hujus modi re tantoque bello, maxlmae curae est, ut quae copus et
opibus tenere vix possumus, ea mansuetudine et continentii nostra,
socioruni fidelitate ceneamus."

Cic. EptsT.


LONDON:


PRINTED FOR LONGMAN, HURST, REFS AND ORMF;,

PATERNOSTER-ROW, AND J. RIDGEWAY,

PICCADILLY.


1806.
[Price Five Shillings}


AN


INQUIRY,


INTRODUCTION.

Since the constitution of this country
acquired its present form, and public bu-
siness came to be transacted regularly in
the great council of the nation, it has
been customary in all important junc-
tures, for our representatives to undertake
a general investigation of the state of our
affairs. The method of conducting this
examination has varied at different periods.
Sometimes a motion for inquiry has been

B


2 AN INQUIRY INTO THE

agreed to by the ministry, and their adver-
saries have been permitted to bring for-
ward their propositions upon the situation
of the commonweaUh. Sometimes the
motion for inquiry has been opposed,
while a view of the pubhc misfortunes
was given as the ground of claiming a
solemn investigation. But in every case
the inquiry has substantially been entered
into, and has consisted always in the free
and comprehensive discussion to which
such motions gave rise.

Those who have attended to the tactics
of parliamentary debate, and remarked
how greatly the separation of diiFerent
articles of charge assists the party accused
in shifting off the attack from any one
point, will easily admit the superior ad-
vantages of such a comprehensive view
of tlie actual posture of affairs, as we
commonly denominate " a state of the
nation'' It happens, however, that se-
veral years have now elapsed, preg-
nant beyond all former experience in dis-
■ strous changes, without any discussion of


STATE OF THE NATION.


this wholesome and constitutional nature.
In consequence, too, of certain recent oc-
cvirrences, it has been found impossible to
investigate at all, even in their distinct cha-
racter, those measures which occupied the
government during the last vacation. And
thus a new ministry is formed, and a
new system about to commence, before
the account has been settled with the old ;
before the causes of our present calami-
ties have been ascertained ; before the na-
tion has been able to determine, either
the extent or the origin of its dangers.
Greatly as this change of men and of mea-
sures is to be rejoiced at, we may ven-
ture to question, whether it would not
have secured more solid benefit to the
country, had it been delayed until the wis-
dom of parliament had been applied, to
such a full discussion of the late calami-
tous interference with continental affairs ;
and such a comprehensive review of our
present situation in every particular, as
can alone furnish the ground-work of that
radical change of system, in which our

B 2


4 AN INQUIRY INTO THE

only remaining chance of salvation must
be sought.

It is to be feared, however, that the
change of ministry has deprived us alto-
gether of the benefits which would have
resulted from a parliamentary investigation
of these grave and difficult subjects : and
it becomes the more necessary to attempt
such a compilation xof particulars, as may
assist the public in examinmg the question
out of doors. — With this view the follow-
ing statement is drawn up. It is a very
humble attempt at providing a substitute
for the information respecting the state of
their affiiirs, which the people would have
received from the deliberations of their
representatives, had the formation of the
new ministry been so long delayed as to
have given time for an inquiry into the
state of the nation.

This disquisition may conveniently be
arranged under three heads — as it relates
to the state of our foreign relations, our
domestic oecononiy and our colonial
affairs. It is of the last importance that


STATE OF THE NATION. O

the country should be able to estimate the
nature and extent of its resources in each
of these departments ; and to appreciate
the system of management in all of them,
which has given rise to the unparalleled
dangers that at present surround us on
every side. After examining under each
head the causes of our calamities, and fairly
stating their real extent, we shall shortly
inquire if there are any changes of system
by which the fate of the empire may yet
be stayed.


/


AN IN-QmRY INTO TH2


rOREIGN RELATIONS.

In discussing this primary and import-
ant branch of the subject, it is necessary
to dwell at greater length on points which
have never been brought before the Houses'
of Parliament. Of these the most material,
is the late continental policy of the British
government. We shall accordingly begin
with an examination of the various particu-
lars presented by the history of the *' Third
grand Coalition." We shall then take a
view of the situation in which it has left
our external relations. Our attention will be
directed in the next place toward the re-
maining objects of foreign policy in the
present crisis ; more particularly the state
of the neutral questions ; and we shall con-
clude with suggesting the change of sys- ,
tem which the previous deductions appear
to prescribe.

1. THE LATE CONTINENTAL ALLIANCE.

1 . Tlie first circumstance which strikes
us in contemplating the system of nego-


STATE OF THE NATION. 7

tiation lately pursued by the British cabi-
net is, that the documents laid before par-
liament furnish no evidence of any at-
tempts having been made to procure the
mediation of our allies for an amicable ad-
justment of our differences with France.
As, far back as May 1803, a direct assure-
ance was given by ministers, that they
would solicit the mediation of Russia, and
in recommending this salutary measure,
all parties cordially united. A communi-
cation of a pacific nature was received
from the French government at the begin-
ning of 1805. His Majesty declined en-
tering into any negotiations until he should
consult his allies, and especially the Em-
peror of Russia ; but he expressed himself,
at the same time, desirous of seeing such
a peace established as might be consistent
with security and honour.

It is well known that the dispositions of
Russia towards this country were never
more favourable, nor her sense of duty
towards the rest of Europe more strong,
than at the time when the king returned
this answer. — Our cabinet then, with the


8 AN INQUIRY INTO THE

concurrence of all parties, stood pledged
to procure, if possible, the .mediation of
Russia : The dispositions of France were
officially announced, at least, to be pacific.
Russia was engaged in the most confiden-
tial intercourse with us : His ^Majesty was
advised only to delay entering upon an
amicable discussion with France, in con-
sequenceof that intercourse with Russia. —
Might it not have been expected that our
cabinet would seize this happy juncture,
to press for the mediation of our august
ally, and thus to redeem its pledge, at
least, if not secure an honourable termina-
tion of the dispute ? Yet it is not a little
remarkable, that in the whole mass of
papers laid before parliament with a view
of detailing the history of the late negoti-
ation, no traces whatever are to be found
of any steps towards obtaining the medi-
atory interference of Russia.

On the contrary, our communica-
tions with that power have been from
the beginning of a war-like nature. —
The treaty of' Concert, nth April,
1805, the first result of our negotiations,


STATE OF THE NATION. Q

is framed for tlie purpose of marching half
a million of men against France, in the pay
ofEngland, (Art. in*.) That a mediator of
'differences should be in a respectable state of
strength, in order to interpose with effect,
is not denied ; but no power can assume
the functions of an umpire after forming
such a concert with one of the con-
tending parties. It deserves further to
be remarked, that the pacific inclina-
tions expressed in his Majesty's answer
to the French message, appear never to
have produced any effect on our negotia-
tions. The Cabinets of Vienna and St.
Petersburgh wem engaged in the cor-
respondence which gave rise to the war,
as far back as November, 1804. The
British government vras a party to this
intercourse at the same time. The French
message was communicated during these
negotiations, and no circumstance appears
either in the official documents, or in the
conduct of the parties, tending to shew that
this pacific proposal produced any effect

* Treaties, p. 9. f Sapplementarv Papers, p. I,


10 AN IXQUIRY INTO THE

upon tlic progress of an interoourse avow-
ed] v hostile to France.

But it may be said that the seizure of
Genoa rendered it impossible for Russia ta
mediate, or hold any amicable corre-
spondence with France. To this various
answers are obvious. The Russian medi-
ation was first thought of long after the
invasion of Sv»itzerland^-a violation of the
treaty of Luneville infinitely more im-
portant to the interest of all parties, than
the annexation of Genoa. The incorpora-
tion of Piedmont, without any indemnity
to the king of Sardinia, was made in ex-
press violation of the same treaty, and in
contempt of specific engagements with
Russia herself: yet this neither prevented
Russia from offering her mediation, nor
our government from })lcdging themselves
to accept it. But, in truth, it is absurd to
lay any stress upon the seizure of Genoa,
when the first article of the treaty of
Concert, concluded two months before that
event, bound Russia and England to league
against France in measures of hostility,
" without waiting for further encroach-


STATE OF THE NATION. 1 1

ments on the part of the French goYcrn-
ment*."

Long before the seizure of Genoa, then,
we had given up every chance of Russian
mediation, by our hostile league with the
court of St. Petersburgh ; and that event
was view ed with exultation by the friends
of the new war, as an additional means of
rousing Austria and Russia to join us — not
w^th regret as an obstacle to the work of
pacification, which w^e had pledged our-
selves to undertake. Even after our allies
had placed themselves in a commanding
posture of military preparation, and were
fully disposed to embrace whatever plan
might be most effectual for restraining the
encroachments of France, no attempt was
made to avail ourselves of so favourable a
juncture, for effecting that object in the
manner pointed out in 1803, by the united
voice of parliament. Our government
seems only to have been anxious that there
should be a battle, and impatient but to
see the fighting begin. This leads us to

Treaties, p. 8.


12 AN INQUIRY INTO THE

the next remark suggested by the history
of tlie Jate coalition.

2. The league appears to have had no
precise or definite object in view. To at-
tack France, and try the issue, is the only
fixed point of concert. How far the alUes
"were prepared, in the event of their suc-
cess, to propose such an arrangement as
might secure the future independence of
Europe, may be determined by a conside-
ration of the purposes for which they avow
that the league was formed. These are
stated in Art. it. of the treaty of Concert*.
We shall begin with the independence of
Holland.

By the treaty of Luneville, the inde-
pendence of Holland was guaranteed, and
at the peace of Amiens France pledged
herself to withdraw all her troops from
the Dutch territories. It is of little mo-
ment to inquire by what circumstances
the fulfilment of these stipulations was
retarded. The war between France and
England finally prevented them from
taking effect ; but France has repeatedly
* Treaties, p. 9.


STATE OF THE NATIOX. 13

declared her readiness to evacuate Holland
as soon as the other points in dispute
should be settled. Suppose the new con-
federates \^ ere successful in the war, and
demanded a renewal of the stipulations
respecting Holland. France withdraws
her troops from that country during the
peace which ensues — during the period
when it is not her interest to keep troops
there. But as soon as a new war breaks
out — as soon as the occupation of Holland
is of the smallest importance to France, or
detriment to us, has she not the means of
again overrunning the Dutch territories in
a week ? The whole of Flanders, from
Ostend to Antwerp, from Antwerp to
Wesel, is hers. No barrier remains be-
tween the enormous mass of the French
dominions, and the little, insulated, de-
fenceless province of Holland. The
strongest part of her frontier, the triple line
of fortresses which surround France on the
north, is opposed to the weakest side of
the Dutch territories. Long before the
guaranties of Batavian independence could
possibly send a man to the Rhine, the


1 4 A\ INQUIRY INTO THE

French would take Amsterdam, and keep
the country as easily as they can defend
the rest of their provmces. The Hollanders
of this age are no longer the men who in-
undated their fields to defend their hberty.
France has a party in the councils, and in
the nation of the republic, and nothing
could be more chimerical than to hope
that she would meet with any resistance
from the unaided patriotismi and resources
of this state.

When, therefore, the new alliance
professes to have in view the establish-
ment of the Dutch independence, one
of two things must be meant : either that
nominal independence which consists in
the removal of French troops, and which
was guaranteed in the treaty of Luneville —
or that real independence which consists
in security from French influence during
peace, and invasion during war; which was
obtained for the Dutch by their own spirit,
and the assistance of their allies at the be-
ginning of the eighteenth century ; which
they only lost by the conquest of Bel-
gium. To make war for the first of these


STATE OF THE NATION. 15

objects was evidently most unwise : it was
attained by the treaties of Luneville and
Amiens, and, when attained, was perfectly
useless. To make war for the second
object was quite absurd, unless those other
measures were in contemplation, which
alone could secure it ; and the treaty of
Concert gives us no hint v/hatever of any
such measures. We are, therefore, left to
conclude that the allied powers wished to
see Holland once more independent, but
did not know how to gratify this desire ;
that they had a general design of, freeing
the Dutch from French influence, but
could discover no means of doing so ;
that, therefore, they resolved to attack
France, but, if successful, they were not
prepared with any specific demands in fa-
vour of Holland. In so far then as the
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