[PDF]Thoughts on the present state of affairs with America, and the means of conciliation

The

Robert E. Gross
Colleci:ion

A Memorial to the Founder
of the


Business Administration Library
Los Angeles


THOUGHTS


ON THE


PRESENT STATE OF AFf AIRS


WITH


AMERICA,


AND


THE MEANS OF CONCILIATION.


By WILLIAM PULTENEY, Esq^


THE FIFTH EDITION.


LONDON


Printed for J. D O D S L E Y in Pallmall;

AND T. CAD ELL IN THE Strajiq.

MDCCLXXVIII.


THOUGHTS

o n T H E

Prefent State of Affairs with America,

AND

THE MEANS OF CONCILIATION*


THOSE who have any enthufiafm with rc-
fpeft to publick matters, and who feel in
their own minds a ftrong and clear conviftion,
with regard to any important public queflion, are
apt to fuppofe, that men who profefs to entertain
^ contrary opinion, are influenced by fome bafe^
factious, or corrupt motive. They make no al-
lowance for thofe natural caufes of difference of
opinion, which have exilled in all ages. They will
not condefcend to argue patiently with fuch men,
ftill lefs will they fufFer themfelves to fuppofe,
that their own ideas may be in fome degree erro-
neous, and that the truth may lie between the two
oppofite fentiments.

When civil difputes have gone fo far, as to put
arms into the hands of each of the parties, the
pow^r of argument is then completely at an end.

B The


[ 4 ]

The agitation of violent paflions confirms more
powerfully each of the parties in their firft preju-
dices > and, until fome great calamity or fome
great and unavoidable danger occafions a paufe,
the voice of reafon will in vain endeavour to make
itfelf heard.

The great queftion which has for many years
agrtated this country, concerning America, and
has lighted the flames of civil war, affords a con-
vincing proof, with how much violence perfons of
the firft abilities, are capable of embracing the
oppofite fides of doubtful public controverly, at
the fame time that it furnifhes an interefting ex-
ample, how very little mere force, is calculated to
convince the underftandings, or to remove the
prejudices of mankind ; and though much has
been wrote and fpoken upon the fubjeft, on both
fides of the Atlantic, it feems to me, that neither
fide have hitherto allowed a fufficient degree of
weight to the arguments of their opponents, nor
has the queftion, hitherto, been treated with that
•calmnefs, which promifed to difcover the truth> or
with that impartiality, which was calculated to re-
concile the naturalprejudicesof contending parties.

Thofe who have at all accuftomed themfelves
.to refleflion, are inclined an every occafion, tofuf-
•pedl the fairnefs of arguments, which are urged
with too much zeal. In the prefent great difpute,
the love of Liberty, natural to a Briton, and
the principles in which I have been educated, on
the one handj and my attachment to Great Bri-
tain, where my property, and all my friends and

;, con.


[ 3 1

connexions are fituated, on the other j have all
along balanced my mind in fuch a manner, as to
prevent, I truft, my running into the extremes of
either party; and as I feel myfelf incapable of
being influenced by any bafe motive, fo my care
to avoid political connexions of all kinds, has, I
hope, preferved my underftanding, in Ibme de-
gree at leaft, from being warped upon this occa-
fion. If, therefore, my talents were equal to the
talk, of canvafling properly this great queflion,
there is nothing to obftruct my doing it in a fair,
candidj and impartial manner.

The late events in America feem to have occa-
fioned fome degree of paufe ; and I hold it to be
the duty of every impartial man, to feize that fa-
vourable moment, of laying before the public fuch
lights, as he may think of fufEcient importance to
call for their attention.

The lentiments which I Ihall deliver, are the
refult of my own xefledions, without a view to
{civc either thofe who are in, or out of office, but
with a very fincere defire, to ferve my country in
general; and whatever refped I may entertain, for
many gentlemen who have enrolled themfelves on
either fide of this queflion, that refpeft fliall not
prevent me, from canvafling the fubjeft with the
utmofl: freedom.

In treating of this important matter, I will begin •
with a review of the grounds which have induced
the Americans to take up arms, and will conflder
whether a fufficient weight has been allowed to
thefe motives, on the part of Great Britain. I will
B 2 then


t 4 ]

then examine the grounds and motives of Great
Britain, for rejecfling the claims of the Colonies,
and infifting on the full and uncontrolled exercife
of Legiflative Power in America; and whether
the Americans have given due weight, on their
part, to thefe motives. This examination of the
fubje(fl, will naturally fuggeft the reafonablenefs
and pradlicability of a reconciliation, by which
each party will depart in fome degree from their
pretenfions.

I believe there is now no doubt, that the true
motive which has united fo great a part of the
Americans in the prefcnt conteft with Great Bri-
tain, is the claim of Britain to a power of taxing
them by the Parliament here, and of altering their
Charters of Government, without any application
for that piirpofe from themfelves, by the fole
power of our Legillature. If any man doubts
that this is the cafe, let him recolleft, that, before
the aera of the Stamp Acl, there was no inftance
of any general combination in America, to refift
the authority of this country ; that fuch a general
combination did immediately take place, after th^
pafTing of that adl, an agreement, I think, was
entered into by moft of the Colonies, not to imr
port or to confume any of our goods or manu-
faftures ; but fo foon as the Stamp Aft was re-
pealed, that combination, and the non-importa-
tion agreement was diflblved, and great rejoicings
were made in confequence of that repeal, in al-
Tnoft every part of America. At that time many
pamphlets were publiihed in America, difcuffing

the


[ s 1

the right of this country to tax them, and point-
ing out the confequences which might follow,
from the admiflion of fuch a right. And ib foon
as a new attempt was made by the Aft 7 th of His
Majefty, to impofe another tax upon tea and
other articles, the fame fort of general combina-
tion followed, and the pamphlet, intitled " ters from a Pennfylvania Farmer," afcribed to
Mr. Dickenfon, was eagerly and univerfally read.
But when all thefe taxes, except the tax upon tea,
were repealed in 1770, and flrong aflurances
were given, in the name of Government, by the
Earl of Hillfborough's circular letter to each of
the Colonies, that it was the determined refolution
here, 'to impofe no new taxes upon them, the fe-
cond importation agreement was gradually dif-
folved, though, as the tea tax was not repealed,
fome of the mofl zealous Americans endeavoured
ftill to keep it on foot : but the general good fenfe
of the people, when their fears were quieted, pre-
vailed then (as 1 hope and trufl it will do now),
and harmony was reltored. No attempt was at
this time made, to alter the Charters of the Colo-
nies, and therefore it does not appear, that their
fears were excited with refpeft to that important
point i but the immediate effeft in America of the
Bill for altering the Charter of the MafTachufet's
Bay, is a proof of their fentiments concerning the
confequences of fuch a power, veiled in the Par-
liament of Great Britain.

Ifhall


[ 6 ]

•" I fhall hereafter take notice of the arguments
of thofe who contend, that the Americans had long
ago formed the plan of rendering themfelves inde-
pendent of Great Britain, and that the fear of
parliamentary taxation was not the motive, but the
pretext for taking up arms againft this country.
At prefent I fliall take it for granted, that our
claims to a right of taxation, and of altering their
charters of government, were the true motives of
the American refiftance, and Ihall confider what
degree of juftification arifes, from the apprehen-
fion which they might fairly entertain concerning
the exercife of thefe powers.

When the American Colonies were fuccelTively
fettled, they each obtained from the Crown,
charters, eftablifhing a form of civil governments
which, though differing a little from each other,
yet in all, refembling very much the Conftitution
of Great Britain. They had each an afTembly
chofen by the people, a Council refembling our
Houfe of Lords, and a Governor reprefcnting his
Majefty. By the united concurrence of thefe
three branches, laws were made, which had force
to bind all the inhabitants of the relpeftive Colo-
nies, and taxes were by them impofed ; but no
law or adt of their Legiflature could continue va-
lid, unlefs confirmed by his Majefty in council.
By this laft check. Great Britain was fecured, that
no aft prejudicial to this country could have the
force of a law; for, if his Majefty had been ad-
vifed by his Privy Council, to give his aflent to

any


[ 7 ]

any fuch improper ad, there can be no doubt, that
thofe members of the Privy Council, who gave
fuch advice, might have been called to account
by Parliament, and fubjedted to impeachment,
as well as for advifing any other abufe of the
royal prerogative.

On the other hand, by this fpecies of conftitu-
tion, the Colonies were poflefTed of a controul,
fituated upon the fpot, and placed in the hands of
the reprefentatives of the people, upon the Go-
vernor or executive power in each Colony. They
had alfo a general controul upon the adminiftra-
tion of juftice j and the fame ibrt of general fu-
•perintending and inquifitorial power, for control-
ling public abufes of all kinds, which belongs to
the Houfe of Commons in this country ; and the
members of Aflembly claimed, and by ufage ac-
tually enjoyed, all the perfonal privileges within
each Colony, which belong to tlie members of the
Britilh Houfe of Commons.

Every perfon who has at all confidered the
Conftitution of this kingdom, muft know, that
the efTence of the liberty of a Briton, confifts in
the controlling power of the two houfes of Parlia-
ment, without which, the prerogatives neceflarily
veiled in the Crown, and the necelTary difcre-
tionary power vefted in thofe who adminifter ju-
ftice, would, in fpite of the beft laws, and in fpite
even of the controul of juries, that ineftimabl^e
inftitution, perpetually tend to abufe, and that
Britons would othcrwife feel in fome degree, that

degrading


I « 1

degrading anxiety, which, in other countries, de-*
bafes the human mind, under every fpecies of ab^*
folute Government.

One of the moft material fupports of the con*
trolling power of the Houfe of Commons in this
country, is its power over the public purfe, and
that no money can be levied upon the people
without the vote of that houfe ; and though a very
great revenue in taxes is now ellabliflied by per-
manent afts, for the intereft of the public debts,
and other taxes to a large amount are granted to
his Majefty for life, as the expence of his civil
lift J yet the land tax and the malt tax have ne-
ver been granted as a perpetuity, and for a long
time pafl, thefe taxes have only been voted an*
nually. Without the grant of thefe. Government,
on its prefent footing, could not go onj for though,
in times of peace, the taxes eftabliflied for the in-
tereft of the public debts, afford a furplus called
the Sinking Fund, which comes into the Exche-
quer annually without any new vote j yet that mo-
ney could not be applied by Government, to any
other purpofe than the payment of part of the
public debts, without confent of Parliament j nei-
ther would that furplus, if feized illegally by the
executive power, be fufficient to pay the expence
of the loweft peace eftablilhment.

His Majefty is therefore under the neceflity of
tailing both Houfcs of Parliament together an-
nually, in order to have the land and malt tax
voted i and when they arc called, they have a right
4 to


[ 9 ]

to inquire into all abufes, and to refiife voting the
money until thefe abufes are redreiTed.

In former times, the dignity of the Crown was
fupported by the revenue of the Crown lands, and
the hereditary revenues to which the King, as
feudal Lord,- was intitled. During that period,
the Crown was not under the fame neceflity, as
now, of calling Parliaments annually together, in
order to obtain the neceffary grants of money j
and accordingly it often happened, that Parlia-
ments were not called for many years j by which
means, they were deprived of the opportunity of
redrefling grievances, or of enquiring into abufes.
The alienation of the Crown lands, and the abor
lition of the feudal tenures, has undoubtedly put
the Crovrn more in the power of Parliament than
formerly; but a-s that dependance has obliged the
Minifters of the Crown, to pay more attention to
the fecuring a cortftant majority in Parliament, the
burdens of the State have undoubtedly been there-
by greatly incfeafed, and this country, pays enor-
rnoufly, for the change which has happened, in the
mode of exercifmg the influence of the Crown,
which formerly confifted in prerogative, but now
confifts in the influence of Minifters upon the par-
ticular Members of both Houfes, and upon the
Ele6lors of the Houfe of Commons.

I do not however adopt the idea of thofe, who
feem to think, that the corruption of Parliament
has arifen to fuch a pitch, that it has become
merely an engine in the hands of Government.
There are, I truft, a great majority in both Houfes,

C who


[ < ro ]

who would refiit with the fpirit becoming free*
men, any dired attempt in the Minifters of the
Crown to overturn the liberties of this countiy ;
and I believe and truft, that there is a ftill greater
majority in the kingdomx, who would, upon a
like occafion, difcover their refentment in fuch a
manner, as would make the Members of the t^e-
gidature, as well as the Minifters of the Crown,
tremble for their own fituation. I do alfo firmly
believe, that the general voice of the nation, will
for a long, and I hope for a very long time, con-
troul the proceedings of Parliament, in fpite of any
corruption of the Members, efpecially, whilfl
our franding army is reduced in time of peace,
and is compofed of native troops, and command-
ed by gentlemen of property ; and that the fpirit
of our Militia is preferved. But at the fame
time, I acknowledge, and every man muft feel,
that the influence of the Crown upon Parliament,
is already an alarming circumftance, and that the
expence of conducing Government upon that plan
is enonrious ; and as the progrcfs of defpotifm in
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