[PDF]Money Bank Credit And Economic Cycles De Soto
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Money,
Bank Credit,
and
Economic Cycles
Money,
Bank Credit,
and
Economic Cycles
Jesus Huerta de Soto
Translated by Melinda A. Stroup
Ludwig
von Mises
Institute
AUBURN, ALABAMA
First Spanish edition 1998, Dinero, Credito Bancario y Ciclos
Economicos, Union Editorial, Madrid
Copyright © 1998 Jesus Huerta de Soto
Second Spanish edition 2002, Union Editorial, Madrid
Copyright © 2006 Jesus Huerta de Soto
Translated from Spanish by Melinda A. Stroup
First English edition 2006, Money, Bank Credit, and Economic Cycles,
Ludwig von Mises Institute, 518 West Magnolia Avenue,
Auburn, Alabama 63832-4528
All rights reserved. Written permission must be secured from the
publisher to use or reproduce any part of this book, except for
brief quotations in critical reviews or articles.
ISBN: 0-945466-39-4
ISBN: 978-0-945466-39-0
Contents
Preface to the English-Language Edition xvii
Preface to the Second Spanish Edition xix
Introduction xxi
Chapter 1: The Legal Nature of the Monetary
Irregular-Deposit Contract 1
1 A Preliminary Clarification of Terms:
Loan Contracts (Mutuum and Commodatum)
and Deposit Contracts 1
The Commodatum Contract 2
The Mutuum Contract 2
The Deposit Contract 4
The Deposit of Fungible Goods or "Irregular"
Deposit Contract 4
2 The Economic and Social Function of Irregular
Deposits 6
The Fundamental Element in the Monetary
Irregular Deposit 7
Resulting Effects of the Failure to Comply
with the Essential Obligation in the
Irregular Deposit 9
Court Decisions Acknowledging the
Fundamental Legal Principles which Govern
the Monetary Irregular-Deposit Contract
(100-Percent Reserve Requirement) 11
v
Money, Bank Credit, and Economic Cycles
3 The Essential Differences Between the Irregular
Deposit Contract and the Monetary Loan Contract ... .13
The Extent to Which Property Rights are
Transferred in Each Contract 13
Fundamental Economic Differences Between
the Two Contracts 14
Fundamental Legal Differences Between the
Two Contracts 17
4 The Discovery by Roman Legal Experts of the
General Legal Principles Governing the Monetary
Irregular-Deposit Contract 20
The Emergence of Traditional Legal Principles
According to Menger, Hayek and Leoni 20
Roman Jurisprudence 24
The Irregular Deposit Contract Under Roman
Law 27
Chapter 2: Historical Violations of the Legal Principles
Legal Principles Governing the Monetary
Irregular-Deposit Contract 37
1 Introduction 37
2 Banking in Greece and Rome 41
Trapezitei, or Greek Bankers 41
Banking in the Hellenistic World 51
Banking in Rome 53
The Failure of the Christian Callistus's Bank 54
The Societates Argentariae 56
3 Bankers in the Late Middle Ages 59
The Revival of Deposit Banking in
Mediterranean Europe 61
The Canonical Ban on Usury and the
"Depositum Confessatum" 64
vi
Contents
Banking in Florence in the Fourteenth Century ... .70
The Medici Bank 72
Banking in Catalonia in the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Centuries: The Taula de Canvi 75
4 Banking During the Reign of Charles V and the
Doctrine of the School of Salamanca 78
The Development of Banking in Seville 79
The School of Salamanca and the Banking
Business 83
5 A New Attempt at Legitimate Banking: The Bank of
Amsterdam. Banking in the Seventeenth and
Eighteenth Centuries 98
The Bank of Amsterdam 98
David Flume and the Bank of Amsterdam 102
Sir James Steuart, Adam Smith and the
Bank of Amsterdam 103
The Banks of Sweden and England 106
John Law and Eighteenth-Century Banking in
France 109
Richard Cantillon and the Fraudulent Violation
of the Irregular-Deposit Contract Ill
Chapter 3: Attempts to Legally Justify
Fractional-Reserve Banking 115
1 Introduction 115
2 Why it is Impossible to Equate the Irregular Deposit
with the Loan or Mutuum Contract 119
The Roots of the Confusion 119
The Mistaken Doctrine of Common Law 124
The Doctrine of Spanish Civil and Commercial
Codes
vii
127
Money, Bank Credit, and Economic Cycles
Criticism of the Attempt to Equate the Monetary
Irregular-Deposit Contract with the Loan or
Mutuum Contract 133
The Distinct Cause or Purpose of Each Contract . .134
The Notion of the Unspoken or Implicit
Agreement 139
3 An Inadequate Solution: The Redefinition of the
Concept of Availability 147
4 The Monetary Irregular Deposit, Transactions
with a Repurchase Agreement and Life Insurance
Contracts 155
Transactions with a Repurchase Agreement 157
The Case of Life Insurance Contracts 161
Chapter 4: The Credit Expansion Process 167
1 Introduction 167
2 The Bank's Role as a True Intermediary in the Loan
Contract 172
3 The Bank's Role in the Monetary Bank-Deposit
Contract 178
4 The Effects Produced by Bankers' Use of Demand
Deposits: The Case of an Individual Bank 182
The Continental Accounting System 184
Accounting Practices in the English-speaking
World 194
An Isolated Bank's Capacity for Credit
Expansion and Deposit Creation 200
The Case of a Very Small Bank 208
Credit Expansion and Ex Nihilo Deposit
Creation by a Sole, Monopolistic Bank 211
viii
Contents
5 Credit Expansion and New Deposit Creation by
the Entire Banking System 217
Creation of Loans in a System of Small
Banks 223
6 A Few Additional Difficulties 231
When Expansion is Initiated Simultaneously by
All Banks 231
Filtering Out the Money Supply From the
Banking System 239
The Maintenance of Reserves Exceeding the
Minimum Requirement 242
Different Reserve Requirements for Different
Types of Deposits 243
7 The Parallels Between the Creation of Deposits
and the Issuance of Unbacked Banknotes 244
8 The Credit Tightening Process 254
Chapter 5: Bank Credit Expansion and Its
Effects on the Economic System 265
1 The Foundations of Capital Theory 266
Human Action as a Series of Subjective
Stages 266
Capital and Capital Goods 272
The Interest Rate 284
The Structure of Production 291
Some Additional Considerations 297
Criticism of the Measures used in National
Income Accounting 305
2 The Effect on the Productive Structure of an Increase
in Credit Financed under a Prior Increase in
Voluntary Saving 313
IX
Money, Bank Credit, and Economic Cycles
The Three Different Manifestations of the
Process of Voluntary Saving 313
Account Records of Savings Channeled into
Loans 315
The Issue of Consumer Loans 316
The Effects of Voluntary Saving on the
Productive Structure 317
First: The Effect Produced by the New Disparity
in Profits Between the Different Productive
Stages 319
Second: The Effect of the Decrease in the Interest
Rate on the Market Price of Capital Goods 325
Third: The Ricardo Effect 329
Conclusion: The Emergence of a New, More
Capital-Intensive Productive Structure 333
The Theoretical Solution to the "Paradox of
Thrift" 342
The Case of an Economy in Regression 344
3 The Effects of Bank Credit Expansion Unbacked
by an Increase in Saving: The Austrian Theory or
Circulation Credit Theory of the Business Cycle 347
The Effects of Credit Expansion on the
Productive Structure 348
The Market's Spontaneous Reaction to Credit
Expansion 361
4 Banking, Fractional-Reserve Ratios and the Law of
Large Numbers 385
Chapter 6: Additional Considerations on the Theory
of the Business Cycle 397
1 Why no Crisis Erupts when New Investment is
Financed by Real Saving (And Not by Credit
Expansion) 397
x
Contents
2 The Possibility of Postponing the Eruption of the
Crisis: The Theoretical Explanation of the Process
of Stagflation 399
3 Consumer Credit and the Theory of the Cycle 406
4 The Self-Destructive Nature of the Artificial Booms
Caused by Credit Expansion: The Theory of
"Forced Saving" 409
5 The Squandering of Capital, Idle Capacity and
Malinvestment of Productive Resources 413
6 Credit Expansion as the Cause of Massive
Unemployment 417
7 National Income Accounting is Inadequate to Reflect
the Different Stages in the Business Cycle 418
8 Entrepreneurship and the Theory of the Cycle 421
9 The Policy of General-Price-Level Stabilization and
its Destabilizing Effects on the Economy 424
10 How to Avoid Business Cycles: Prevention of and
Recovery from the Economic Crisis 432
11 The Theory of the Cycle and Idle Resources:
Their Role in the Initial Stages of the Boom 440
12 The Necessary Tightening of Credit in the Recession
Stage: Criticism of the Theory of "Secondary
Depression" 444
13 The "Manic-Depressive" Economy: The Dampening
of the Entrepreneurial Spirit and Other Negative
Effects Recurring Business Cycles Exert on the
Market Economy 456
14 The Influence Exerted on the Stock Market by
Economic Fluctuations 459
15 Effects the Business Cycle Exerts on the Banking
Sector 467
16 Marx, Hayek and the View that Economic Crises
are Intrinsic to Market Economies 468
17 Two Additional Considerations 474
xi
Money, Bank Credit, and Economic Cycles
18 Empirical Evidence for the Theory of the Cycle 476
Business Cycles Prior to the Industrial
Revolution 479
Business Cycles From the Industrial
Revolution Onward 482
The Roaring Twenties and the Great
Depression of 1929 487
The Economic Recessions of the Late 1970s
and Early 1990s 494
Some Empirical Testing of the Austrian
Theory of the Business Cycle 500
Conclusion 503
Chapter 7: A Critique of Monetarist and
Keynesian Theories 509
1 Introduction 509
2 A Critique of Monetarism 512
The Mythical Concept of Capital 512
Austrian Criticism of Clark and Knight 518
A Critique of the Mechanistic Monetarist
Version of the Quantity Theory of Money 522
A Brief Note on the Theory of Rational
Expectations 535
3 Criticism of Keynesian Economics 542
Say's Law of Markets 544
Keynes's Three Arguments On Credit
Expansion 546
Keynesian Analysis as a Particular Theory 553
The So-Called Marginal Efficiency of Capital 555
Keynes's Criticism of Mises and Hayek 557
Criticism of the Keynesian Multiplier 558
Criticism of the "Accelerator" Principle 565
xii
Contents
4 The Marxist Tradition and the Austrian Theory of
Economic Cycles: The Neo-Ricardian Revolution
and the Reswitching Controversy 571
5 Conclusion 576
6 Appendix on Life Insurance Companies and Other
Non-Bank Financial Intermediaries 584
Life Insurance Companies as True Financial
Intermediaries 586
Surrender Values and the Money Supply 591
The Corruption of Traditional Life-Insurance
Principles 594
Other True Financial Intermediaries: Mutual
Funds and Holding and Investment
Companies 597
Specific Comments on Credit Insurance 598
Chapter 8: Central and Free Banking Theory 601
1 A Critical Analysis of the Banking School 602
The Banking and Currency Views and the
School of Salamanca 603
The Response of the English-Speaking World
to these Ideas on Bank Money 613
The Controversy Between the Currency School
and the Banking School 622
2 The Debate Between Defenders of the Central Bank
and Advocates of Free Banking 631
Parnell's Pro-Free-Banking Argument and the
Responses of McCulloch and Longfield 632
A False Start for the Controversy Between
Central Banking and Free Banking 633
The Case for a Central Bank 635
xiii
Money, Bank Credit, and Economic Cycles
The Position of the Currency-School Theorists
who Defended a Free-Banking System 639
3 The "Theorem of the Impossibility of Socialism"
and its Application to the Central Bank 647
The Theory of the Impossibility of
Coordinating Society Based on Institutional
Coercion or the Violation of Traditional
Legal Principles 650
The Application of the Theorem of the
Impossibility of Socialism to the Central
Bank and the Fractional-Reserve Banking
System 651
(a) A System Based on a Central Bank
Which Controls and Oversees a
Network of Private Banks that
Operate with a Fractional Reserve 654
(b) A Banking System which Operates with
a 100-Percent Reserve Ratio and is
Controlled by a Central Bank 661
(c) A Fractional-Reserve Free-Banking
System 664
Conclusion: The Failure of Banking
Legislation 671
4 A Critical Look at the Modern Fractional-Reserve
Free-Banking School 675
The Erroneous Basis of the Analysis: The
Demand for Fiduciary Media, Regarded as
an Exogenous Variable 679
The Possibility that a Fractional-Reserve
Free-Banking System May Unilaterally
Initiate Credit Expansion 685
The Theory of "Monetary Equilibrium" in
Free Banking Rests on an Exclusively
Macroeconomic Analysis 688
xiv
Contents
The Confusion Between the Concept of Saving
and that of the Demand for Money 694
The Problem with Historical Illustrations of
Free-Banking Systems 701
Ignorance of Legal Arguments 706
5 Conclusion: The False Debate between Supporters of
Central Banking and Defenders of Fractional-
Reserve Free Banking 713
Chapter 9: A Proposal for Banking Reform:
The Theory of a 100-Percent Reserve Requirement 715
1 A History of Modem Theories in Support of a
100-Percent Reserve Requirement 716
The Proposal of Ludwig von Mises 716
F.A. Hayek and the Proposal of a 100-Percent
Reserve Requirement 723
Murray N. Rothbard and the Proposal of a
Pure Gold Standard with a 100-Percent
Reserve Requirement 726
Maurice Allais and the European Defense of
a 100-Percent Reserve Requirement 728
The Old Chicago-School Tradition of Support
for a 100-Percent Reserve Requirement 731
2 Our Proposal for Banking Reform 736
Total Freedom of Choice in Currency 736
A System of Complete Banking Freedom 740
The Obligation of All Agents in a Free-Banking
System to Observe Traditional Legal Rules
and Principles, Particularly a 100-Percent
Reserve Requirement on Demand Deposits . . . .742
xv
Money, Bank Credit, and Economic Cycles
What Would the Financial and Banking System
of a Totally Free Society be Like? 743
3 An Analysis of the Advantages of the Proposed
System 745
4 Replies to Possible Objections to our Proposal for
Monetary Reform 760
5 An Economic Analysis of the Process of Reform
and Transition toward the Proposed Monetary
and Banking System 788
A Few Basic Strategic Principles 788
Stages in the Reform of the Financial and
Banking System 789
The Importance of the Third and Subsequent
Stages in the Reform: The Possibility They
Offer of Paying Off the National Debt or
Social Security Pension Liabilities 791
The Application of the Theory of Banking
and Financial Reform to the European
Monetary Union and the Building of the
Financial Sector in Economies of the
Former Eastern Bloc 803
6 Conclusion: The Banking System of a Free Society 806
Bibliography 813
Index of Subjects 859
Index of Names 871
XVI
Preface to the
English-Language
Edition
I t is a genuine pleasure for me to see this handsomely-
printed English edition of my book, Dinero, Credito Bancario
y Ciclos Economicos, which first appeared in Spain in 1998.
This translation incorporates the small number of corrections
included in the second Spanish edition of January 2002, and it
is the result of the great effort of Melinda A. Stroup, who
wrote the first English manuscript of the entire book.
This English version was thoroughly examined by Dr. Jorg
Guido Hiilsmann, whose comments on several important
points improved the manuscript significantly. I would also
like to acknowledge the work of my research assistant, Gabriel
Calzada, who searched for various English editions of rare
books unavailable in Spain and looked up certain quotations
and references. Last, I personally inspected the final version in
its entirety to ensure the accuracy of its content.
I am grateful to the Ludwig von Mises Institute, and espe-
cially to its president, Lewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr., for bringing
the project to its culmination with such high standards.
Jesus Huerta de Soto
Senorio de Santa
May 2005
Note: The author welcomes any comments on this English-language
edition and requests they be sent to huertadesoto@dimasoft.es.
xvii
Preface to
the Second
Spanish Edition
F ollowing the success of the first edition of Dinero, Credito
Bancario y Ciclos Economicos, which sold out rapidly, I am
pleased to present the second edition to Spanish-speak-
ing readers. To avoid confusion and facilitate the work of
scholars and researchers, the contents, structure, and page
numbering of the first edition have been maintained in the
second, though the book has been thoroughly examined and
all misprints detected have been eliminated.
In the wake of a decade marked by great credit expansion
and the development of a large financial bubble, the course of
economic events in the world from 1999 through 2001 was
characterized by the collapse of stock-market values and the
emergence of a recession which now simultaneously grips the
United States, Europe, and Japan. These circumstances have
left the analysis presented in this book even more clearly and
fully illustrated than when it was first published, at the end of
1998. While governments and central banks have reacted to
the terrorist attack on New York's World Trade Center by
manipulating interest rates, reducing them to historically low
levels (1 percent in the United States, 0.15 percent in Japan and
2 percent in Europe), the massive expansion of fiduciary
media injected into the system will not only prolong and hin-
der the necessary streamlining of the real productive struc-
ture, but may also lead to dangerous stagflation. In light of
these worrisome economic conditions, which have repeated
themselves since the emergence of the current banking sys-
tem, I fervently hope the analysis this book contains will help
the reader to understand and interpret the phenomena which
surround him and will exert a positive influence on public
xix
Money, Bank Credit, and Economic Cycles
opinion, my university colleagues and economic-policy
authorities in government and central banks.
Various reviews of this book's first edition have appeared,
and I am grateful to the eminent authors of them for their
many positive comments . 1 A common denominator among all
has been to urge the translation of this book into English, a
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